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NOTE
DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES IN
VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT V. ACTON:
ORWELL'S 1984 BECOMES VERNONIA'S
REALITY IN 1995
I. INTRODUCTION
America is in the midst of an intense battle against childhood drug
abuse. What makes the battle more poignant is the shockingly young age
of the children who are "playing" with illegal drugs. The National Institute
on Drug Abuse reported in 1990 that approximately twenty-three percent
of children, ranging in age from twelve to seventeen, acknowledged use of
one or more illicit drugs, and forty-eight percent admitted drinking
alcohol.' American schools are also battling drug abuse on the athletic
fields. In fighting the war against drug abuse, schools are implementing
random, suspicionless drug testing programs focused on student athletes.2
These types of programs, however, raise several constitutional concerns.3
Schools' random drug testing programs may constitute unreasonable
searches and seizures in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment. This,
in turn, violates privacy rights of students subjected to these programs.
1. NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE:
MAIN FINDINGS 1990, DHHS PUBLICATION No. (ADM) 91-1789, WASHINGTON, D.C. at 14, 20
(1991).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION AND U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL DRUG PREVENTION/EDUCATION PROGRAMS 70 (Oct. 1987). The
report stated that "[b]ased on a random, stratified sample of 700 school districts, respondents
indicate that nearly three-fourths of the districts have a written policy on substance abuse and
three-fifths require substance abuse education for at least some grade levels." Id. at part I, § 1,
at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
3. Random drug testing has raised constitutional issues in a variety of contexts, including
schools and railroads. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(challenging a Federal Railroad Administration regulation authorizing railroads to administer
breath and urine tests to employees who violate safety rules); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (challenging school drug testing program on Fourth
Amendment grounds).
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Yet, in the wake of student athletes' fatal drug overdoses,4 schools may
have little choice but to challenge the limits of Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the hope of
preventing drug abuse by students.
In recent years, several students have challenged the constitutionality
of drug testing programs.5 In March 1995, the United States Supreme
Court faced this legal question in Vernonia School District v. Acton 47J.6
Specifically, the Court decided whether the Fourth Amendment allows a
school to conduct suspicionless, random drug testing of its student
athletes. 7 In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court ruled that public
schools can require student athletes to submit to random drug tests prior to
participating in sports.8 Yet the rationale of this decision is far from
flawless. This Note focuses on the "reasonableness" of the random,
suspicionless drug testing program implemented by the Vemonia School
District. It explores the case of James Acton, a seventh grade student at
Washington Elementary School in Vernonia, Oregon, who just wanted to
play football. His opposition to the conditions placed on his participation
in a school sport escalated into a United States Supreme Court decision.
In defining the constitutional notion of "privacy," the Court upheld the drug
testing program and severely limited student athletes' privacy rights.
Part II of this Note discusses the background of the Vemonia School
District's drug testing policy, the beginning of James Acton's fight for his
constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment's meaning of privacy. Part III details the Oregon district
court's and the Ninth Circuit's opinions of the case. Part IV examines the
Supreme Court decision in Acton L Part V analyzes the flaws of the
Court's decision. Finally, Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court
decided the case on moral grounds rather than on precedent. This Note
contends that that is an unacceptable basis for a Supreme Court decision,
especially one that affects thousands of innocent students.
4. See Susan Schmidt & Tom Kenworthy, Cocaine Caused Bias' Death Autopsy Reveals,
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1986, at Part III.
5. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) [hereinafter Acton 1]
(student challenging the random drug testing program as violating the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County. Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (two
students involved in extra-curricular sports challenging the constitutionality of the drug testing
program).
6. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
7. Id.
8. David G. Savage, High Court OKs Routine Testing Of Students For Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1995, at Al.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Need for Drug Testing in Vernonia
Vemonia is a small logging community of approximately 3000
residents located on the coast of Oregon, about one hour west of Portland.9
Approximately 700 students attend the four schools that the Vernonia
School District ("the District") operates, 0 and about sixty to seventy-five
percent of elementary school and high school students participate in a
District-sponsored sport." In the mid-to-late 1980s, the District deter-
mined that a drug abuse problem existed within the student body. Athletes
appeared to be the leaders of the school's drug movement.'2  Teachers
reported that students frequently expressed an interest in drugs. Along with
that expressed interest came an increased number of disciplinary
problems. '3 Also, the District was also concerned because drug abuse
might increase the risk of sports-related injuries. 4
The District's initial response to the alleged drug problem was to offer
special lectures and assemblies to convince students that drugs are
harmful. 5 Subsequently, the District implemented the Student Athlete
Drug Policy ("the Policy") in the fall of 1989.16 The Policy's stated
purpose is "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their
health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs."'
17
9. Respondents' Brief at *6, Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (No. 94-590)
(1995) (available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
10. Id.
I1. Brief of the Petitioner Vemonia Sch. Dist. at 9-10, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (No. 94-590) (1995)
(available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief]. The District offers
basketball, cross country, football, golf, track, wrestling, and volleyball. Id.
12. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
13. Id. at 2388.
14. Id. at 2389.
15. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at *7. Respondent alleged that the District blatantly
overstated the drug "problem." The Actons claimed that there was "no evidence of any athletes
in Vernonia ever competing while on drugs, let alone causing or sustaining injury." Respondent
contended that the evidence the District presented was almost exclusively the perception of a few
teachers and administrators. Id.
16. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
17. Id.
1996]
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B. The Policy
The Policy requires that any student who desires to participate in
interscholastic athletics sign a consent form authorizing the District to
conduct random urinalysis drug testing.18  In addition, the student's
parents must sign the form.' 9 All athletes are tested at the beginning of
their particular sport season and then are placed in a pool each week from
which ten percent are chosen randomly for testing.20 Gender determines
testing protocol. Boys are taken to the locker room where they must
produce a urine specimen at a urinal while an adult monitor watches and
listens to ensure accuracy; girls produce their samples in an enclosed stall
while a female monitor listens for the normal sounds of urination." Any
student randomly selected who refuses to be tested is suspended
automatically from the sports program for the rest of the season.22 A
student who is taking any prescription medications must identify them with
a copy of the prescription or a doctor's note.23 Samples are sent to an
independent laboratory where they are tested for amphetamines, cocaine
and marijuana, but not for alcohol or performance enhancing drugs, such
as steroids.24
Confidentiality is maintained in the testing process, due to the
sensitive nature of the information that drug testing yields. The laboratory
is unaware of the identities of the students whose specimens are being
tested. In addition, the laboratory is authorized only to report test results
to the District superintendent and personnel only if an authorization code
18. Id. The form reads in part:
I... authorize the Vemonia School District to conduct a test on a urine specimen
which I provide to test for drugs and/or alcohol use. I also authorize the release
of information concerning the results of such a test to the Vernonia School District
and to the parents and/or guardians of the student.
Striking a Balance on School Drug Tests, PHOENIX GAZETTE, June 28, 1995, at B6.
19. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at *18.
23. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct at 2389.
24. See id. It is very surprising that the District, being so concerned about drug use by
student athletes, would not test for alcohol (a substance to which school children have easy
access, sometimes even in their own homes) or steroids (a drug that students likely might take
to enhance their athletic performance), two typical drugs that are probably more available to
students than marijuana and cocaine. If the true purpose is to stop or prevent drug abuse by
student athletes, the District's test appears to be underinclusive and probably not as effective as
it could be. See also discussion infra part V.B.
25. Acton I, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
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is used and confirmed.26 Only the District superintendent, principals,
vice-principals, and athletic directors have access to test results.2 7
A student who tests positive for drugs is tested a second time as soon
as possible to confirm the result.28 If the second test result is negative,
there is no further action.29 If the second test is positive, the student's
parents are notified and the school principal holds a meeting with the
student and parents to discuss the options available to the student.30
C. Acton 's Battle Begins
In 1991, James Acton, a seventh grade student at Washington
Elementary School, signed up to play football.3 He was not allowed to
participate, however, because both he and his parents declined to sign the
consent form authorizing random drug testing.32 Alleging that the Policy
violated James's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Nine of the Oregon
Constitution, James and his parents filed suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from compliance with the Policy.33
D. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for
protection of personal privacy and from unreasonable searches or intrusions
by the state.34  A brief overview of the history of the Court's
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2390.
29. Id.
30. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. The options given to a student testing positive for the first
time are: (1) six weeks participation in an assistance program with weekly urinalysis; or (2)
suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the entire next athletic
season. A second offense results in automatic imposition of the second option, and the third
offense results in automatic suspension for the remainder of the current season and for the next
two athletic seasons. Id.
31. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
32. Id. There was no reason to believe that James was using drugs nor any evidence to
support that contention. James's father testified that he believes "the drug test is an invasion of
James's privacy and a violation of his civil rights." Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at *21.
33. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
34. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
1996]
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interpretation of the Fourth Amendment sets the stage for a discussion of
the Vernonia School District v. Acton decision.
1. Searches in Public Schools
Courts historically have held that school officials act in loco
parentis,35 rather than as state actors, and therefore upheld searches at
public schools.36  However, in New Jersey v. TL.O., 37 the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects students' privacy rights.
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that schools act as parental
surrogates, and held that school officials are representatives of the state and
"cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment., 38  Thus, TL.O.'s holding established that school officials
are state actors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis.
2. Whether Certain Conduct Constitutes a
"Search" That Is "Reasonable"
Upon determination that the Fourth Amendment is implicated in the
public school setting, the next issue is whether or not the conduct
constitutes a search. An activity constitutes a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes if it infringes upon a person's "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy., 39  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Associ-
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. The term in loco parentis means: "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged,
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787
(6th ed. 1990).
36. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (holding that a canine sniffat
a junior and senior high school was not a search because school officials were acting in loco
parentis).
37. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., school authorities found a student who was violating
school rules by smoking cigarettes in the restroom. The student was taken to meet with the
Assistant Vice Principal, who asked her if she had been smoking. Upon her denial and based on
the report of the teacher finding her in the restroom, the Assistant Vice Principal searched her
purse and found cigarettes. After pulling out the cigarettes, he noticed cigarette rolling papers,
which he recognized were used to roll marijuana cigarettes. He then searched more thoroughly,
finding a pipe, marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. The Assistant Vice Principal turned the
items over to police, and as a result, delinquency charges were brought against the respondent.
At her trial, respondent moved to suppress based on the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court
held that the search was valid because it was based on "reasonable suspicion." The Court further
stated that the search was valid because the need for the school to maintain an environment
conducive to learning outweighed respondent's expectation of privacy. Id.
38. Id. at 336-37.
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ation, ° the Supreme Court held that state collection and testing of urine
does, in fact, constitute a "search" subject to the conditions of the Fourth
Amendment." Therefore, the District's activity of collecting and testing
students' urine samples constitutes a search regulated and protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a governmental search is
constitutional only if it is reasonable." The Supreme Court previously
held that the "reasonableness" of a specific search "is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."'43 In general, a warrant
must be issued to meet the reasonableness requirement," and due to the
importance of the warrant requirement, the Court consistently has allowed
very few exceptions.45 The Supreme Court, however, has held that a
search is reasonable even if conducted without a warrant "when special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." '46 The critical question, then,
is whether searches in public schools, such as random drug testing of
student athletes, make the warrant and probable cause requirements
unrealistic.
In New Jersey v. TL. 0., 4 7 the Court upheld a search based on
individual suspicion rather than probable cause. The Court noted that in
public school settings, the requirement of obtaining a warrant "would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures," and "strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based
upon probable cause" would undermine "the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."'
40. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
41. Id. at 617.
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
43. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2386, 2388 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979))).
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Issuing a warrant serves two constitutional protections: (1)
to prohibit searches without probable cause because "any intrusion in the way of search or seizure
is an evil[,]" and "no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of
necessity;" and (2) any search that is deemed necessary "should be as limited as possible." To
be avoided is "a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
45. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
46. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
47. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
48. Id. at 340-41.
19961
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Therefore, based on the TL. 0. rationale, a public school district could
conduct drug testing of students suspected of drug use.
3. Individual Searches Without Individual Suspicion
Logically, the next question is whether warrantless searches are
constitutional even though they lack individual suspicion. Although the
factual situation of TL.O. involved individual suspicion, the Court stated
in dicta that its decision did not stand for the proposition that individualized
suspicion was an element of the reasonableness test of a Fourth
Amendment search.49 The TL. 0. Court, borrowing from Delaware v.
Prouse,50 restated the rule that "[e]xceptions to the requirement of
individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only when the privacy
interests implicated by a search are minimal" and where additional
safeguards are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the
field.
, ,'f l
The Supreme Court has found governmental searches lacking
individualized suspicion constitutional when grave danger exists and
substantial harm could occur if rule violations, such as drug or alcohol use,
are taking place. In Skinner,5" the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing
of railroad employees involved in train accidents. 3 Further, in Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab,54 the Supreme Court allowed the government to
49. See id. at 341.
50. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
51. Id. at 654-55 (citing Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
52. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) obtained
evidence indicating that alcohol and drug use by railroad employees either caused or contributed
to several train accidents. One study depicted 23% of operating personnel as problem drinkers;
13% of employees admitted that they came to work slightly drunk and 5% admitted that they
were very drunk while at work. Id. at 607 n.l. In response to this evidence, the FRA
promulgated regulations authorizing, inter alia, blood and urine tests of employees after certain
major train accidents, and breath and/or urine tests of employees who violate specified safety
rules. The Court upheld the regulations, stating that the government's interest in preventing train
accidents was compelling because targeted employees must participate in the "discharge [of]
duties [that are] fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of
attention can have disastrous consequences." Id. at 628. The Court decided that these safety
concerns outweighed the privacy interests of the employees, and that the search was
constitutional. Id.
53. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
54. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Von Raab involved a drug testing program for customs agents who
either were directly involved in drug interdiction, handled classified material, or carried firearms.
The Court cited Skinner regarding the incredible risk of injury that custom agents may pose if
they use drugs, especially if they participate in the three above activities. It concluded that in
exceptional cases, where the government's interest in testing to prevent grave danger outweighs
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conduct random drug tests on federal customs officers who carry weapons
or who work in drug interdiction." Finally, the Court upheld mobile
checkpoints intended to look for illegal immigrants and contraband under
the Fourth Amendment as well.56 Thus, it is possible for a search, subject
to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, to be considered constitutional even without
individualized suspicion under circumstances that pose an ominous threat
of danger.
III. DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
A. The District Court's Ruling
Prior to Acton I, there was no straight-forward rule regarding the
constitutionality of suspicionless searches in public schools. The only case
analogous to Acton is New Jersey v. TL.O.,"7 yet even the facts of that
case differ significantly from those presented in Acton.
58
The Actons began their fight against the Vernonia School District in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district
court interpreted the TL. 0. decision as standing for the proposition that the
limitations of the Fourth Amendment are "relaxed" 59 in the public school
setting. After discussing TL.O., Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School
District,60 and cases challenging drug testing programs at the collegiate
an individual's privacy expectations, the suspicionless drug test is constitutional. See id. at 665-
66.
55. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
56. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte, the search
in question involved Border Patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent checkpoint on
a major California highway near the Mexican border. The Court said that the search was
constitutionally sound, even in the absence of individualized suspicion. The Court reasoned that
it would be impracticable to have individualized suspicion for illegal aliens, when the border was
near a heavily travelled major highway. The Court also said that based on the circumstances of
the checkpoint stops, which did not involve searches, the governmental interest outweighed the
privacy interest of the individual. Id.
57. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
58. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. T.L.O. is different factually from Acton L
In T.L.O., the Assistant Vice Principal had some suspicion that the student was smoking;
therefore, the Court held that the search of her purse was constitutional. In Acton I, on the other
hand, the Policy administers random drug tests, which are not suspicion-based.
59. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (Or. 1992) [hereinafter Acton
III.
60. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of random urinalysis
testing of participants in interscholastic athletics).
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level,6 ' the district court determined that to evaluate the "reasonableness"
of the Policy, it had to apply a balancing test. Since James was not
suspected of drug use, the District had to demonstrate a compelling need
for the program that outweighed the intrusion upon James' privacy
rights.62
The court focused on several factors in determining whether the
District's Policy was reasonable. The first factor the court considered
important was that coaches had observed both poor student performance in
athletics and actual student drug use.63 Second, the court found that the
testimony of a doctor provided support for the Policy. He reported that a
random drug testing program could have a deterrent effect on actual drug
use.64 The court also thought that because athletes were subjected to a
number of rules and regulations when they chose to participate in school
athletics, the drug test should be considered just another rule to follow.
6
Another factor the court recognized was the District's effort to limit the
extent of the intrusion, in that the randomness of the Policy limits the
degree of discretion that school administrators may exercise. 66 Finally, the
court recognized that the District actually tried alternative methods to deal
with the increase in drug-related problems, thereby suggesting that the
Policy was the next "logical step. 67 Weighing these factors against the
61. See generally Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (holding un-
constitutional the urinalysis of individual students suspected of marijuana use, given the
unreliability of test results and the lack of evidence to justify the intrusive procedures); Derdeyn
v. University of Colo., 832 P.2d 1031 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993)
(holding that drug testing in college athletic program violated the Fourth Amendment because the
University's interest in securing a drug free athletic program was not compelling); Hill v. NCAA,
801 P.2d 1070 (1990) (holding a college drug testing program invalid under the California
constitution because the evidence of a compelling state interest did not outweigh the student's
right to privacy).




66. Id. at 1364. The court noted that because the urine testing was random, the
administrators did not have a chance to exercise discretion on who would and would not be
tested. Acton I1, 796 F. Supp. at 1364.
67. Id. The court gave significant weight to the testimony of Dr. DuPont, who stated that
because some people do not display outward manifestations of drug or alcohol use, an
individualized suspicion standard for testing would be ineffective in preventing accidents. Id.
It is ironic that the court gave this testimony such weight while simultaneously supporting the
constitutionality of the Policy with the testimony of school personnel. Coaches and teachers
observed students acting out and noticed, to use the words of the doctor, "outward manifestations"
of the effects of drug use. The testimony of the doctor and the testimony of the school personnel
plainly contradict each other.
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privacy interests of students, the district court held that the Policy was
constitutional.68
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding and invalidated
the Policy. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit immediately recognized the
Actons' assertion that even if a drug problem existed in Vernonia schools,
it did not justify a random testing program. 69 After determining that the
conduct of the school constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment
and that the officials who executed the test had the authority to do so,
Judge Fernandez addressed the reasonableness of the search.7" Under
Delaware v. Prouse, courts should weigh the following factors in assessing
the reasonableness of a non-suspicion-based test:
(1) the importance of the governmental interests; (2) the degree
of physical and psychological intrusion on the citizen's rights;
(3) the amount of discretion the procedure vests in individual
officials; and (4) the efficiency of the procedure-that is how
well it contributes to the reaching of its purported goals and how
necessary it is.7
The Ninth Circuit found that the District's Policy only met two prongs
(three and four) of the Prouse reasonableness test: contributing to reaching
its desired goal (prong four), and vesting no discretion in the school
administrators (prong three). 72 The importance of the school's interests
(prong one) and the intrusiveness of the search (prong two), however,
caused the Policy to fail the reasonableness test.
73
The appellate court discussed at great length the importance of
balancing the governmental interests against an individual's right of
privacy. The District argued that because the Oregon Supreme Court
previously held that compliance with hunting and fishing laws was a
sufficient state interest to justify a random search procedure for checking
hunting licenses, the interest in "freeing schools from the pernicious effects
68. Id. The court found that because the Actons "failed to demonstrate that the defendant's
drug testing program unconstitutionally interfered with their son's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment," the Policy was constitutional.
Id. at 1365.
69. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Acton III].
70. See id. at 1519-20.
71. Acton 111, 23 F.3d at 1521 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-63 (1979)).
72. Id. at 1522.
73. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
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of illegal drugs" was equally sufficient to justify the Policy. 4 The court
rejected this proposition, stating that the two situations were not comparable
because the level of intrusion of privacy was different. 5 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that in the Oregon Supreme Court decision, the
government interest only needed to be legitimate, while Supreme Court
cases dealing with random drug testing require a compelling state interest. 6
In determining that the Policy did not sufficiently satisfy the
reasonableness test, the Ninth Circuit compared this case to previous
Supreme Court decisions upholding random drug testing. The Ninth
Circuit found two distinct differences: (1) the privacy interests of student
athletes have not been diminished to the level of workers in high-risk
industries or high security government positions; and (2) the District's
desire to prevent unnecessary athletic injuries, to reduce the fascination and
use of drugs, and to rectify discipline problems does not compare to the
kinds of dangers and hazards involved in prior Supreme Court cases.7
The opinion of the appellate court considered the tragedy of drug abuse and
its impact on children and society in general. However, it went on to
recognize that "it is not the type of potential disaster that has caused the
Court or us to find a governmental interest compelling enough to permit
suspicionless testing."" Thus, the appellate court did not find the
District's interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh a student athlete's
expectation of privacy. As a final note, the appellate court wisely
recognized that given the standard of TL.O., the District's interests would
probably warrant individualized, suspicion-based drug testing. The interests
did not, however, justify random drug testing.79
74. Id. (citing State v. Tourtillot, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (Or. 1980)).
75. Id. at 1522.
76. Acton 11, 23 F.3d at 1522.
77. Id. at 1525-26. The court cast aside the District's ;ontention that athletes enjoy a
reduced expectation of privacy because participating in the sports program carries with it many
rules that make the situation analogous to federal employees or railroad workers. See id. at 1525
(citing IBEW, Local 1245 v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 525 (9th
Cir. 1992); AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1991); Bluestein v. Skinner,
908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court also disregarded the notion that conditions in a school
locker room reduce an athlete's expectations of privacy. Acton Il, 23 F.3d at 1525. "Normal
locker room or restroom activities are a far cry from having an authority figure watch, listen to,
and gather the results of one's urine." Id. In discussing the District's interests, the court rejected
the idea that the danger of injury inflicted while playing sports under the influence of drugs is
analogous to the risk of a train wreck or a nuclear power plant disaster. Id. "The concern that
our children will fail to acquire knowledge or respect is also real enough, but it, too, does not
reach the level of the concerns that have permitted suspicionless testing." Id. at 1526.
78. Acton 111, 23 F.3d at 1526.
79. Id.
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probably warrant individualized, suspicion-based drug testing. The interests
did not, however, justify random drug testing.79
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit, held that
random drug testing in the Vernonia School District was constitutional and
did not violate James Acton's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.8" The majority, spearheaded by Justice Scalia, articulated
a similar decision to that of the district court. Applying the
"reasonableness test" to determine if the District's search was
constitutional, the majority opinion focused on the balance between two
factors: (1) the degree of intrusion on a person's Fourth Amendment
privacy interests; and (2) the promotion of "legitimate governmental
interests."
81
1. Student Athletes Harbor a Lower Expectation of Privacy
Generally a warrant will be issued for a governmental search once
probable cause has been established. The majority highlighted an exception
to this general rule.82 Although the Court never before expressly held that
the Fourth Amendment requires suspicion for a search to be considered
constitutional, dicta in TL.O. implied this notion.83  The majority,
therefore, leaped to the conclusion that because the Court had never said
that suspicion was necessary under the Fourth Amendment, it was not
necessary in the case of random, suspicionless drug testing.
Having decided that suspicion was not a prerequisite for a govern-
mental search, the majority continued its discussion of the privacy factor
of the reasonableness test. The majority recognized two elements leading
to the conclusion that student athletes have a lower expectation of privacy:
79. Id.
80. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 115 S. Ct. at 2386 (1995) [Acton 1].
81. Id. at 2390 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979))).
82. Id. at 2391.
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (citing United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)). Although the majority in Acton I describes this proposition
as "explicitly acknowledged," in actuality, the statement was made in a footnote in T.L.O.. Acton
1, 115 S.Ct. at 2391.
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(1) students are children who have been entrusted temporarily to the state's
custody; 4 and (2) student athletes specifically choose to subject them-
selves to a higher degree of regulation.85 The Court previously recognized
in TL. 0. that due to the nature of the custodial relationship between public
schools and students, public school officials can exercise a higher amount
of supervision and control than could be exercised over "free adults."86
The second element, however, had not been addressed previously.
Surprisingly, the majority did not give much thought to the second
element of the privacy factor. The majority facilely stated that because
athletes choose to participate in sports, they subject themselves to higher
regulations than non-participating students and must have lower expec-
tations of privacy as well.87 In addition, the opinion referred to the
internal design of the locker room to support its contention that student
athletes have lower privacy expectations because the showers, dressing
rooms, and toilet stalls are not partitioned.88 The majority, therefore,
implied that student athletes actually expect less privacy protection under
the Fourth Amendment, and random drug testing should not be treated
differently than other requirements that athletes must fulfill.
2. The District's "Compelling Interest"
The Supreme Court's discussion of the District's compelling interest
paralleled that of the Oregon district court. The district court relied on
holdings in prior cases stating that the District had to demonstrate a
compelling need for the drug testing program because it was not suspicion-
based.89 The Court stated that "the phrase [compelling interest] describes
an interest which appears important enough to justify the particular search
at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be relatively
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy."90 Rather than weighing
each factor of the "reasonableness test" separately and then balancing them
to determine the random drug testing program's constitutionality, the
84. Actonl, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
85. Id. at 2393.
86. Id. at 2392.
87. Id. at 2393. The majority decided that since there were requirements for participating
in school sports--such as maintaining a specific grade point average, submitting to a physical
exam, and obtaining adequate insurance--student athletes had lower expectations with regard to
governmental searches. Id.
88. Id.
89. Acton I, 115 S. Ct. at 2394 (citing Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354,
1363 (1992) [Acton 11]).
90. Id. at 2394-95.
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majority used the previously determined lower expectation of privacy to
decide the weight of the District's interest. 9
The Court mentioned several important issues in support of its finding
that the District's motivation for implementing the Policy satisfied the
"compelling interest" requirement. First, the majority discussed the serious
effects of drug use, especially on young children. 92 Next, the opinion
discussed the district court's finding that a large portion of the student body
was "in a state of rebellion. 93 Finally, the Court summarily dismissed the
issue of whether a more narrowly tailored test, namely one based on
individualized suspicion, would be appropriate here.94 Keeping these
factors in mind, the majority stated that the District met the compelling
interest requirement in order to subject persons to non-suspicion-based
searches.
The Court balanced the privacy expectations of student athletes
against the District's governmental interests. In light of the student
athlete's lowered privacy expectations and the District's compelling
interests, the Court definitively stated that the Policy was reasonable. In
91. It is troubling that the Court did not independently weigh the factors of the
reasonableness test, especially when dealing with an important constitutional right. Perhaps the
decision would have been different if the Court had examined the District's compelling interest
without the Court-determined diminished value of the student athlete's privacy right. Given that
the majority did not articulate specifically what the District's compelling interest in implementing
the Policy was, however, weighing this factor independently would be difficult.
92. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. The majority opinion devoted more time equating the
importance of preventing drug abuse by children with the governmental concern of deterring drug
use by railroad employees than discussing the privacy expectations of student athletes. It is ironic
that the Court devoted more time to discussing what might happen if a child uses drugs as
opposed to what did happen to a student athlete's Fourth Amendment rights when they were
subjected to random drug testing not based on individualized suspicion.
93. Id. (quoting Acton II, 796 F. Supp. at 1357). The Court stated that this epidemic was
"an immediate crisis of greater proportion than existed in Skinner." Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989)). In Skinner, the Court upheld random drug
testing of railroad employees without specific proof that a drug problem existed. Id. Yet the
magnitude of potential harm in each situation seems to contradict this contention. An inebriated
railroad engineer could cause the death of many railroad passengers and employees; the same
cannot be said of a student who uses illicit drugs. The Court makes inappropriate, unsupported
comparisons in terms of magnitude of harm caused by the drug use of railroad employees versus
student athletes.
94. Id. at 2396. The Court stated that just because there was a "less intrusive" search
available, it did not mean that the program at issue was necessarily unconstitutional. Yet, the
Court did not describe when a "less intrusive" test could render a particular search un-
constitutional. Instead, the majority discussed the implications of a suspicion-based drug testing
policy, describing it as unpleasant because (1) parents would not agree to support it; (2) if a
student was accused of using drugs it would be a "badge of shame;" and (3) teachers might
suspect a "troublesome but not drug-likely" student of using drugs and subject that student to
unnecessary testing. Id. See discussion infra part V.A.
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a six-three decision, the United States Supreme Court held that random,
non-suspicion-based drug testing did not violate the constitutional
protections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.95
B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg concurred that the District's random drug testing
policy was constitutional. She affirmed the Court's findings that student
athletes have a lower privacy expectation and that drug use by student
athletes can potentially cause harm to other players.96 Justice Ginsburg
filed a separate opinion to clarify that she disagreed that the Court's
decision could be applied inferentially to "routine drug testing ... on all
students required to attend school." 97 Justice Ginsburg may be saying
that, through the Acton I decision, the Court was only considering the
constitutionality of a mandatory random drug testing program for student
athletes, not programs encompassing all public school students.
C. The Dissent
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, began with a firm statement
of disapproval for the majority's holding. The overall concern was that,
based on the rationale of the Court's ruling, millions of student athletes
could be stripped of their constitutionally protected privacy rights,
unsupported by any kind of suspicion whatsoever.9" The dissenters based
their view that the District's Policy was unconstitutional on several
grounds: (1) the history of the Fourth Amendment precluding suspicionless
searches; (2) the Fourth Amendment's per se invalidity of blanket, non-
suspicion-based searches; (3) the propensity for an individualized search
requirement; and (4) an alternative to random drug testing was available to
the District."
1. The History of the Fourth Amendment
The dissent focused on the history of the Fourth Amendment as an
introduction to its disagreement with the majority's decision. Justice
O'Connor recognized the general rule that under the Fourth Amendment,
95. Acton 1 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
96. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2397-2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"mass, suspicionless searches" are per se unreasonable.100  She then
considered the recently recognized exception that non-suspicion-based
searches may be constitutional if it has been shown clearly that a suspicion-
based procedure was ineffective.' She concluded that Acton did not fit
the exception.0 2
The dissent presented several authorities illustrating that, with very
few exceptions, the framers of the Fourth Amendment were extremely
hostile to the notion of general searches.'0 3 This portion of the dissent
focused specifically on Carroll v. United States.'O° In Carroll, the Court
illustrated that the Fourth Amendment only condemns searches that are
unreasonable.'0 5 In addition, the Court determined that a search of an
automobile was not unreasonable for lack of warrant because obtaining a
warrant would be impractical.'06 Rather, "a warrantless car search was
unreasonable unless supported by some level of individualized suspicion,
namely probable cause."'0 7  Carroll established the unreasonableness of
conducting uniform searches without probable cause. Subjecting all
persons lawfully using the highways to a search would be intolerable and
inconvenient.' 
08
2. Upholding Blanket Searches?
Justice O'Connor did not hesitate to acknowledge that the Court had
previously upheld some blanket searches, but only after balancing the
privacy interests of the individual being searched against the governmental
interest.'0 9 The dissent, however, distinguished these cases from Acton
100. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Justice O'Connor referred to a 1990 Ph.D. dissertation by W. Cuddihy, that
thoroughly analyzed the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, stating that "what the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed, with limited exceptions wholly
inapplicable here, were general searches--that is, searches by general warrant, by writ of
assistance, by broad statute, or by any other similar authority." Id. (citations omitted).
104. 267 U.S. 132, 143-54 (1925). In Carroll, the Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment does not condemn all searches or seizures. Rather, only unreasonable searches are
unconstitutional. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 153; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) "[S]earches ... without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." The Court in Katz cited Carroll as an
example of an established exception. Id. at 357 n.19.
107. Acton I, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
109. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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because they involved either searches not of a "personally intrusive nature,"
or searches occurring in prisons or other particular contexts." 0 Acton,
however, dealt with the delicate issues of children's privacy rights and
monitored urination in the public school setting. In addition, the Acton
scenario is inapposite to situations like Von Raab and Martinez-Fuerte,
where the Court held blanket, non-suspicion-based searches constitutional.
Given the clear differences, realizing the delicate nature of the search, and
recognizing the importance of the constitutional rights at issue, the
dissenting Justices did not believe that the blanket, suspicionless drug
testing program implemented by the District was warranted.
3. Distinguishing Acton from Skinner
The dissent clearly stated that prior Court decisions held that
suspicionless searches were constitutional only after pointing out that the
Fourth Amendment preference is to require suspicion-based searches."'
Only after applying the general rule did the Court go on to find particular
reasons why such a requirement would be ineffective in an unusual or
troublesome factual situation, such as the one in Skinner.
In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration collected evidence
indicating that alcohol and/or drug abuse by railroad workers did, or at least
may have, contributed to several critical train accidents." 2 Recognizing
that the Fourth Amendment usually requires some form of individualized
suspicion, the Court held that "[i]n limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion."' ' Thus, in Skinner,
the Court recognized that a requirement of individualized suspicion for drug
testing railroad employees would not be practicable because of the
incredibly confusing environment occurring after serious railroad acci-
110. Id. See generally New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (allowing a warrantless
search of a business under the Fourth Amendment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(discussing the constitutionality of body cavity searches of prisoners following contact visits with
persons from outside the institution).
11l. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(recognizing that in extraordinary circumstances where the individual has negligible privacy
interests and the governmental interest is important, a search not based on individualized
suspicion is reasonable).
113. Id. at 624.
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dents. "' 4 In addition, the Court mentioned several other cases where it
held that due to the unusual circumstances presented, satisfying the in-
dividualized suspicion requirement was unrealistic." 5
The dissent recognized that Acton was significantly different from the
exceptional circumstances such as those in Skinner and Von Raab.
116
Justice O'Connor asserted that the majority failed to recognize the history
and precedent establishing individualized suspicion as a factor in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
T" 7
Further, she condemned the majority for easily dismissing the suspicion
requirement as "just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative" if
outweighed by policy concerns separate from the search's prac-
ticability."8
4. The Suspicion-Based Alternative
The dissent addressed the possibility of implementing a suspicion-
based drug testing program, and found it hard to justify the majority's
dismissal of this less intrusive alternative. Justice O'Connor criticized the
District's argument that a suspicion-based program would create an
unwanted adversarial atmosphere." 9 The dissent argued that schools are
already inundated with adversarial schemes in the form of disciplinary
actions that require teachers and administrators to investigate student
misbehavior.2  Therefore, using suspicion-based drug testing in the
school environment would be an insignificant addition of "adversarial" ac-
tions. 2 ' Consequently, the dissent stated that the District was overstating
its concerns with a drug testing program based on suspicion. In fact, a
suspicion-based drug testing program would invade fewer students' privacy
rights, thus making this alternative substantially less intrusive. 22 More
importantly, a suspicion-based program has been tolerated historically and
114. Id. at 631.
115. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (noting the threat of
serious fires if even one safety code is violated); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
670, 674, 677 (1989) (finding that the potential for injuring thousands of people, or possibly
breaching national security, due to even one custom official being bribed, was a situation where
individualized suspicion was impractical).
116. Acton I, 115 S. Ct. at 2401-02.




121. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2402.
122. Id. at 2403.
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generally required by the Fourth Amendment. This requirement "may only
be forsaken, [as] our cases in the personal search context have established,
if a suspicion-based regime would likely be ineffectual.' ' 3
Several factors contributed to the dissent's reasoning that a suspicion-
based program would be effective in the school context. First, the dissent
recognized that basing drug testing on individualized suspicion was an easy
task given the school setting, where students are under the constant
supervision of teachers, administrators, and coaches. 124  Second, a
majority of the evidence that the District used to justify the Policy
identified students acting in a manner consistent with the TL.O. line of
suspicion-based searching. 125 In consideration of all of the evidence and
given the school setting, the dissent stated that an actively enforced
suspicion-based drug testing program "would have gone a long way toward
solving Vernonia's school drug problem while preserving the Fourth
Amendment rights of James Acton and others like him.' 2 6 Thus, Acton
did not represent a particular situation where the Court should forgo the in-
dividualized suspicion requirement of the reasonableness test.
5. Constitutional Protections Come With a Price
The dissent, while strongly criticizing the majority's holding,
recognized that Fourth Amendment protection does not come without a
price. Even though the dissenters felt this situation required application of
the Fourth Amendment's general rule, they did appreciate that a suspicion-
based drug testing program might be less effective than blanket, random
drug testing. 27 Society pays the price for constitutional protection in the
form of a less effective justice system. 28  Certainly justice would be
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Supporting the dissent's point are the words of the District itself:
Students were observed sharing and smoking marijuana at a small restaurant near
the high school. ... Drug paraphernalia, such as marijuana pipes, was confiscated
on school grounds. .. . On one occasion, students admitted to a school official that
they had used marijuana. . . . In classrooms, hallways and at sporting events,
teachers overheard students boast about their drug and alcohol use ....
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 11, at * 12 (citations omitted). In addition, the District uses the
increase of classroom disciplinary problems as support for implementing the program in the first
place. Id.
126. Acton I, 115 S. Ct. at 2403-04.
127. Id.
128. Id. The dissent quoted from Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987), where the
Court had stated that "there is nothing new in the realization that Fourth Amendment protections
come with a price." Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
O'Connor elaborated on this price within the criminal context, stating "the price we pay is higher
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more efficient if police could search anytime and anywhere. But that
would be done at too great a constitutional price. In other words, the
dissent would support a drug testing program based on individualized
suspicion because this better protects an individual's constitutional right to
be free from unwarranted searches and privacy rights.
V. WHERE IS THE REASON IN THIS "REASONABLE" DECISION?
A. What Is Wrong with Suspicion-Based Drug Testing?
One of the major criticisms of the Acton I holding is that the majority
did not thoroughly address suspicion-based drug testing. From the
District's own account, the identities were available of those students who
were seen drunk, under the influence of drugs, or telling a school employee
that the student was under the influence of drugs.'29 Therefore, the
Policy could have targeted students that the District suspected of drug
abuse. A suspicion-based drug testing program is targeted at resolving the
District's drug problem while protecting the rights of student athletes who
are not suspected of drug use.130 Rather than adopting the non-suspicion-
based alternative, the District should have employed a testing program
based on individual suspicion. The route the District took, and which the
Supreme Court upheld, minimizes the importance of protecting the
constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy.
The United States Constitution protects the rights of individuals,
sometimes even at a steep price. For instance, the criminal justice system
is based on the principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty; that
it is better to let a guilty person go free than to put an innocent person in
jail. This principle is embedded in the strict burden of proof in criminal
matters: a person must be guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" before the
trier of fact can convict him or her of a crime. By upholding random drug
testing in public schools, the Court is conveying to children the message
that all athletes are guilty of using drugs until proven innocent.' 31 This
is the wrong message to be sending to the next generation.
in the criminal context, given that police do not closely observe the entire class of potential search
targets (all citizens in the area) and must ordinarily adhere to the rigid requirements of a warrant
and probable cause." Id.
129. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2403.
130. Id.
131. Mary L. Scott, Note, Is Innocence Forever Gone? Drug Testing High School Athletes,
54 Mo. L. REv. 425, 441 (1989).
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Arguably, the foundation of the American legal system takes a toll on
individual's and society's rights. In the drug context, this price is quite
high. Undeniably, drugs kill people every day. Infringing on children's
privacy rights when there is a feasible alternative, however, is equally
offensive. Accordingly, "in our zeal to protect ourselves from [drug abuse],
even more important values are at risk of being swept aside because of our
'war on drugs."",
132
B. The Underinclusive Drug Test
When looking to the District's "compelling interest," one must
consider the drug test itself. Once a student has been randomly chosen to
submit his or her urine to be tested, the laboratory performs tests for the
presence of "amphetamines, cocaine and marijuana,"' 33 and for the
presence of other drugs as requested by the District.'34 When looking at
the issue of implementing random drug testing in public schools, any
analysis should include both the policy behind the program as well as the
ramifications of the implementation itself. The majority opinion, however,
pays very little attention to the District's Policy but instead focuses its
analysis on the implementation of a random drug testing program. The
Court may miss a vital issue by not looking at the Policy because the
Policy's purported purpose included preventing student athletes from using
drugs and protecting their health and safety.135 If the Policy only tests
for marijuana, cocaine and amphetamines, the possibility exists that the
actual test may be ineffective in accomplishing the "compelling interest."
While the testing may cover a portion of drugs used by students, it
does not cover all such drugs. The District should not, however, be
responsible for identifying all illicit drugs used by student athletes. For the
District to further its goals, it must test for at least a significant number of
the drugs that student athletes might be using. For example, alcohol is
probably one of the most readily available drugs to students because it can
be found in most homes. Steroids are another class of drugs that student
athletes are susceptible to using because they enhance performance, and
peer pressure may influence athletes to "be better than the rest." Heroin
and many other popular drugs are also not included in the Policy.
132. Steven 0. Ludd, Athletics, Drug Testing and the Right to Privacy: A Question of
Balance, 34 HoW. L.J. 599, 631 (1991).
133. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 11, at *19.
134. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
135. Id.
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The fact that the District does not test for the drugs that students most
typically use puts in question whether the Policy serves its "compelling
interest." If the Court allows the District to infringe on a constitutionally
based right, the means should be closely related to the District's ends. The
District cannot effectively "prevent student athletes from using drugs,"
"protect their health and safety," and "provide drug users with assistance
programs"'3 6 if it is not consistently testing for more than three drugs.
Thus, the Court overlooked one analytical avenue that could have affected
the decision in this case, a decision that denied constitutional rights to a
student athlete who was never under suspicion of drug use in the first
place.
C. A Lower Level of Privacy Expectations or
a Judicial Judgment Call?
The majority's discussion of a student athlete's expectation of privacy
must not escape criticism. In his discussion, Justice Scalia glosses over the
finding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
that children do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
gate."'37  The majority opinion continues with a broad statement that
when students choose to play a sport, they subject themselves to a higher
degree of regulation, and therefore lower their expectations of privacy.
38
This Note contends that the majority makes too great a leap in judgment.
Justice Scalia expresses that "[s]chool sports are not for the bash-
ful.' 139 For instance, Scalia states that the locker room is constructed so
that athletes must change and shower in front of each other.' 4 This
argument is flawed because it assumes that all student athletes change or
shower at school, when this is not necessarily correct. Assuming,
arguendo, that they do, does this necessarily affect a student athlete's right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? Quite simply, the
answer is a resounding "no." The inference that students forfeit certain
constitutional rights once they engage in changing clothes in other students'
presence in the locker room is unsupported and dangerous. As one critic
stated, "[s]hould we read them a variation of the Miranda warning before
they grab a towel and a bar of soap? ('You have the right to remain
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
138. Id. at 2393.
139. Acton 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
140. Id. at 2392-93.
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sweaty. If you give up that right, your precious bodily fluids are fair game
for the coach and the principal.')"
1 4
The logical extension of Justice Scalia's opinion is that students who
are recognized as having a lower expectation of privacy in the public
school setting also participate in gym class and thus change and probably
shower collectively as well. According to the majority's line of reasoning,
all students would have a lower expectation of privacy. Consequently, so
long as the state asserts a compelling interest, the Court could very likely
find random drug testing of all students to be constitutionally permissible.
Although our society is afraid of the destructive and often tragic effects of
drugs, it should also be leery of the majority's reasoning. The more power
granted to the government "under the guise of safety," the less
constitutional protection remains within society itself.4 ' "In the mean-
time, we should demand that the expanded authority some want to give
government be the least needed to achieve the desired result. The Vernonia
School District drug policy fails that test."'
' 43
D. Circular Reasoning Is Not An Acceptable Basis
for a Supreme Court Decision
As the majority incessantly points out in its decision, student athletes
have a diminished expectation of privacy. As discussed above, this seems
to be a judicial judgment call on the majority's part rather than a decision
based on precedent. Taking this concept one step further unveils a circular
argument. The majority recognized that the government cannot invade the
constitutionally protected right of privacy because of the very obvious as
well as implied protection afforded by the Constitution. Stated in the
contrapositive, if there is no right, or if there is a diminished expectation
of a constitutional right, then the government can invade our privacy. The
majority opinion manipulates the situation in the District's school and
decides that student athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy, and
hence, the government can impose random, non-suspicion-based drug
testing.
In TL.O., the Supreme Court decided that probable cause in a
government search is not required in the context of searches in schools.'"
The majority stated that "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and
141. Peter Callaghan, Supreme Court's School Drug-Test Ruling Flunks Fairness Test, NEWS
TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 29, 1995, at A15.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,
we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."' 145 In the particular
context of public schools, where it would be impractical to require public
school officials to obtain a warrant prior to searching a student's purse,
TL.O. held that according to the Fourth Amendment, the search was
reasonable. 46 The difference between the facts of TL.O. and Acton I is
that the student in TL. 0. was under suspicion of smoking cigarettes at the
time of the search, whereas in Acton, James was under no suspicion
whatsoever of using illicit drugs. To allow the Acton I Court to arbitrarily
decide when suspicion is or is not necessary without clearly defining when
"the public interest is best served" is intolerable.
47
In Acton I, the Court decided that because student athletes have a
lower expectation of privacy, the policy is reasonable. The support for this
determination that the policy is reasonable is that student athletes harbor a
lower level of privacy protection. This reasoning is circular and illogical.
In support of the majority's finding of the diminished privacy expectation,
it offers as proof descriptions of the guidelines that student athletes must
follow as well as a written tour of the locker room. Yet, where is the logic
in concluding that because a student chooses to participate in a sport and
voluntarily subjects himself or herself to the stringent guidelines of
maintaining certain grade point averages, practice routines, and perhaps
even changing in front of other athletes, a student athlete voluntarily gives
up the right to the constitutional protection of individual privacy? Just
because a student athlete voluntarily participates in a program with exacting
guidelines does not necessarily mean that he or she voluntarily gives up a
totally unrelated expectation of privacy. Even the argument that a student
athlete must not care about privacy because participating in sports requires
undressing and showering in front of teammates is illogical. What a person
chooses to do in terms of physical privacy is unconnected to the
constitutional right of privacy, nor is it apparent from the facts that all
student athletes change or shower in front of each other. Before infringing
on the constitutional concept of privacy, the Court should demand
significantly more convincing proof that the individual has in fact
knowingly given up this right. In the instant case, disrobing or showering
should not be equated to shedding an individual's constitutionally protected
privacy right.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 326.
147. Id. at 341.
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The Court must not be allowed to base decisions on such grounds.
Society cannot allow Supreme Court justices to tell it that a particular
group has less constitutional protection than others without legitimate
reasons, if at all. The problem with circular reasoning is that each
statement supports the other, with no independent support for either
proposition. We expect valid reasons for Supreme Court decisions, rather
than decisions based on the Justices' personal opinions. Circular reasoning
without valid support should not be accepted as a basis on which to rest a
Supreme Court decision, especially when dealing with the existence, or lack
thereof, of a constitutionally protected right.
E. Judicial Discretion Leads to Unacceptable Results
The approach the majority takes with the Acton case is not surprising.
As far back as 1951, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
government searches when it decided that the search was unreasonable. In
Rochin v. California,148 three California law enforcement officers entered
a home based on minimal evidence that a resident was selling drugs. When
asked about capsules on the bedside table, the defendant swallowed the
pills. The officers took the defendant to a hospital and had his stomach
pumped after striking him failed to produce the capsules. The capsules
contained morphine, and the defendant was convicted of possessing "a
preparation of morphine."1 49 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, referring, inter alia, to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The majority opinion based the decision on
the behavior of the law enforcement officers. The Court stated that the
process by which the evidence was obtained "shocked the conscience, " '
and thus the conviction could not constitutionally be upheld.
Two Justices concurred with the majority that the method used to
obtain evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Black criticized
148. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
149. Id. at 166.
150. Id. at 165.
151. To elaborate:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of
the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents---this course of proceeding by agents
of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of [sic]
constitutional differentiation.
Id. at 172.
DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT A THLETES
the majority for the ad hoc basis of its holding. Justice Black recognized
the majority opinion as "empower[ing] this Court to nullify any state law
if its application offends 'a sense of justice' or runs counter to the
'decencies of civilized conduct."" 52  He referred to several cases in
which the Court, using its judicial power, denied states the right to
implement programs in order to quell "evil economic practices.
Justice Black recognized that there are constitutional provisions, such as the
Fourth Amendment, that require courts to determine what is an "un-
reasonable" search and seizure." 4 He implied that judicial discretion
potentially infringes on constitutional rights. He concluded his concurring
opinion with a concern that this type of decision making would be used to
"inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights."' 155
Acton I is the fruition of Justice Black's feared prediction. The
Rochin approach is clearly visible within Acton . While the District did
not require "pumping" anything out of James' body, it did force him to
submit to a drug test when he was under no suspicion whatsoever of illicit
drug use. Indeed, the District did require James to urinate in front of a
monitor. The District's Policy constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure because it invaded the privacy of a young child who was not
suspected of drug use. The majority opinion represents another example
of the Court exercising its discretion. In this case it took away James'
constitutionally given privacy right. In Rochin, the Court's holding that the
officer's actions constituted an "unreasonable" search and seizure seems
reasonable given the nature of the search and the severity of their actions.
In Acton I, however, the Court's decision that the Policy is reasonable is
unacceptable. Although the Policy is not as physically offensive as the
officer's actions in Rochin, the emotional effects of a child having to
urinate in front of an adult monitor is "unreasonable," especially given that
the child was under no suspicion of illicit drug use.
It seems that the Court, in its decision, was focusing more on drug
abuse and its devastating impact on children rather than on the actual
situation in Acton. If it had considered the Policy and how it affected
children like James, who were under no suspicion of illicit drug use, it
152. Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring).
153. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 177 (Black, J., concurring). See also Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (preventing bakers from switching smaller loaves of bread for larger
loaves of bread); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (denying a state the right
to fix gasoline prices).
154. Id. at 176 (Black, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring).
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would have determined that the Policy unreasonably infringed on James'
privacy rights. There is no doubt that drug abuse is a destructive
phenomenon that is infesting society, especially considering that children
are using illicit drugs at very young ages. This does not, however, give the
Court the right to let the consequences of drug abuse influence the exercise
of judicial discretion in determining whether a search is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. As the dissent emphasized, the Constitution has
a history that generally requires suspicion as a requirement for subjecting
people to government searches. The Court, in not imposing a suspicion
requirement in random drug testing programs of student athletes, has
exercised its discretion and has "imperil[led] all the individual liberty
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights."'5 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Acton I are
dangerous. Morally speaking, many people might agree with the decision
as it applies to public school students who participate in school athletics
given the seriousness of drug abuse by children. The Court's decision,
however, lacks precedential support, logical reasoning, and factual
support--elements which should appear in all Supreme Court decisions.
In Acton I, the Court dismissed the obvious alternative of suspicion-
based drug testing, thereby damaging the future of privacy rights in public
schools. It is clearly reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to require
student athletes to submit to drug testing based on some form of in-
dividualized suspicion. The Court in Acton I ignored the fact that there
was individualized suspicion for particular student athletes, for they were
observed using drugs and disrupting class. Conducting suspicionless,
random drug testing, however, is unreasonable. By turning a blind eye to
the facts, the Court infringed on constitutionally protected rights. The next
time, this infringement might not be in the context of something as morally
reprehensible as drug abuse.
Samantha Osheroff
156. Id.
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